La comprensión de lo histórico por medio de la “revivencia” en Dilthey confluye con la idea de re-enactment en la teoría de la imaginación histórica de Collingwood a través de la autognosis. Este conocimiento de sí constituye la actividad primordial de la comprensión histórica y es llevado a cabo por el individuo que comprende de acuerdo con los significados vitales y sociohistóricos de su época. Así, las tradiciones del empirismo y del idealismo se acercan en aras de una reflexión sobre (...) la actividad efectiva del historiador. Se analiza, entonces, cuál es el rol de la autoconciencia en el conocimiento humano, atendiendo a las diferencias entre la psicología de ambos pensadores. (shrink)

RESUMEN Partiendo de algunas experiencias del presente, se retoma la interpretación nietzs cheana del resentimiento para explorar la complejidad y ambivalencia del fenómeno e iluminar cuestiones actuales. Así, se vinculan dos tendencias y sus implicaciones: cómo el resentimiento genera la fijación de una identidad amenazadora que lleva a la estigmatización de un otro, a la vez como una forma de rechazo de la contingencia histórica; y cómo el vínculo del resentimiento con la temporalidad, en particular con un tipo de memoria, (...) produce una incapacidad para asumirla creadoramente. Esta reflexión deja abiertas preguntas sobre cómo los cuerpos afectados por el resen timiento pueden revertirlo y dar lugar a formas más vitales de relación con el mundo. ABSTRACT On the basis of selected experiences from the present, the article revisits the Nietzschean interpretation of resentment in order to explore the complexity and ambivalence of the phenomenon and shed light on current issues. To that effect, it connects two tendencies and their implications: the manner in which resentment generates the fixation of a threatening identity that leads to the stigmatization of an other, which, at the same time, involves a rejection of historical contingency; and the manner in which the link between resentment and temporality, in particular with a type of memory, produces an incapacity to assume it creatively. This reflec tion leaves questions open regarding how bodies affected by resentment can twist it around and give rise to more vital forms of relating to the world. (shrink)

RESUMEN Este artículo teje una relación entre el proceso de acumulación de tierras y el despojo en Colombia, para pensar, desde una perspectiva espacial, la relación que se construye con la guerra. El enclave teórico de este artículo sostiene que la colonialidad del poder es también una forma de disociación de la tierra que complejiza la experiencia de la servidumbre. A través de una lectura de pensadores como Marx, Harvey, Castro-Gómez y Mariátegui problematiza la experiencia del despojo de tierras en (...) Colombia y la economía del poder que de allí se desprende. ABSTRACT This paper exposes a relation between the accumulation and dispossession process of land in Colombia as a product of war, from a perspective of space. The theoretical frame of this paper assumes that coloniality of power is a complex form of dissociation of the land, one that transforms the experience of serfdom. Via reading thinkers like Marx, Harvey, Castro-Gómez, and Mariátegui, this paper problematizes the experiences of dispossession of land in Colombia and the economy of power that it engenders. (shrink)

Las críticas de Paul Ricoeur a la jerarquización de las instancias de la temporeidad en Ser y Tiempo nos conducen al análisis de la posibilidad y permanencia de la propiedad para el Dasein cotidiano en el nivel de la historicidad. Esta modalidad permite, en Heidegger, una historia propia, que se distingue de la historiografía tradicional en el uso vital que de ella hace el Dasein. Aquí es crucial la influencia de la Historia crítica de Friedrich Nietzsche. A lo largo de (...) este recorrido podremos también observar el problema de la movilidad de la existencia desde el punto de vista ontológico y el epistémico. (shrink)

PORTUGUESE: Neste artigo, apresentaremos uma visão particular do desenvolvimento de teorias científicas que denominamos (inspirados em Ortega y Gasset) "perspectivismo". Discutiremos como, através desse enfoque, é possível compatibilizar diversas descrições aparentemente distintas e incompatíveis de uma suposta realidade que se investiga. Fazemos isso distinguindo entre a "realidade" (R) e a "descrição empírica da realidade" (Re). Aceitando que podemos ter diversas descrições empíricas de uma mesma realidade, discutimos o caso particular em que esse esquema é utilizado nos debates atuais acerca da (...) ontologia da física quântica, em especial da mecânica quântica não relativista. Como se sabe, essa teoria é compatível com distintas ontologias (ou metafísicas), em particular, pode ser vista como comprometida com uma ontologia de indivíduos, mas também com uma ontologia de não indivíduos. Ambas as alternativas são plausíveis e merecem ser desenvolvidas. Propomos que o perspectivismo aqui apresentado é neutro com relação à escolha de uma metafísica (ontologia), bem como aos debates entre realistas e antirrealistas em filosofia da ciência. Concluímos que passar do pluralismo aceito pelo perspectivista ao realismo ou antirrealismo envolve comprometimento com teses mais robustas acerca da relação entre realidade e descrição da realidade. ENGLISH: In this article we present a particular view of the development of scientific theories which (following Ortega y Gasset), we term "perspectivism". Making use of this view, we discuss how we can accommodate distinct and apparently incompatible descriptions of a supposed reality under investigation. We distinguish between a "reality" (R) and its "empirical description", (Re). Acknowledging that we can have diverse empirical descriptions of the same reality, we discuss the particular case in which the view is applied to current debates on the ontology of quantum physics, especially of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. As it is well known, this theory is compatible with treating quantum objects either as individuals or as non-individuals. Both ontologies are possible and deserve to be developed. We propose that the perspectivism developed here is neutral not only with respect to the choice of an ontology, but also concerning the debates among realists and anti-realists in the philosophy of science. We conclude that to go beyond the pluralism accepted by perspectivism, and to adopt realism or anti-realism, involves commitment to strong theses about the relation between reality and its descriptions. (shrink)

En la primera parte de este artículo, respondemos a los comentarios críticos de Michel Paty sobre nuestro trabajo "Einstein y el efecto Compton". Si bien nuestra intención no fue evaluar la respuesta de Einstein a la evidencia experimental de la hipótesis cuántica de la luz más allá del año 1923, en la segunda parte del artículo evaluamos dos importantes experimentos completados en 1924: los realizados por Bothe y Geiger en Alemania y los de Compton y Simon en los Estados Unidos. (...) Discutimos por qué ambos experimentos proporcionaron pruebas adicionales que respaldaron los puntos de vista de Einstein sobre la teoría cuántica de la radiación. Sin embargo, afirmamos que aun después de conocer estos resultados, Einstein nunca expresó un juicio categórico sobre la realidad de los cuantos de luz tal como el que formuló De Broglie a principios de 1923, con el que comparamos el punto de vista de Einstein. In the first part of this paper we reply to Michel Paty's critical remarks on our paper "Einstein and the Compton effect". We state that we did not evaluate Einstein's response to the experimental evidence about the light quantum hypothesis beyond 1923. Nevertheless, in the second part we analyze two important experiments completed in 1924: those performed by Bothe and Geiger in Germany and by Compton and Simon in the United States. We point out that both experiments provided additional evidence that supported Einstein's views about the quantum theory of radiation. Nonetheless, we contend that even after becoming aware of these results, Einstein never expressed a categorical judgment about the reality of light quanta, such as the one stated by De Broglie as early as 1923, with which we compared Einstein's position. (shrink)

As COVID-19 emerged as a phenomenon of the total environment, and despite the intertwined and complex relationships that make humanity an organic part of the Bio- and Geospheres, the majority of our responses to it have been corrective in character, with few or no consideration for unintended consequences which bring about further vulnerability to unanticipated global events. Tackling COVID-19 entails a systemic and precautionary approach to human-nature relations, which we frame as regaining diversity in the Geo-, Bio-, and Anthropospheres. Its (...) implementation requires nothing short of an overhaul in the way we interact with and build knowledge from natural and social environments. Hence, we discuss the urgency of shifting from current to precautionary approaches to COVID-19 and look, through the lens of diversity, at the anticipated benefits in four systems crucially affecting and affected by the pandemic: health, land, knowledge and innovation. Our reflections offer a glimpse of the sort of changes needed, from pursuing planetary health and creating more harmonious forms of land use to providing a multi-level platform for other ways of knowing/understanding and turning innovation into a source of global public goods. These exemplary initiatives introduce and solidify systemic thinking in policymaking and move priorities from reaction-based strategies to precautionary frameworks. (shrink)

A la luz de algunas críticas recientes, en el marco de este texto se busca impulsar un debate que tiene lugar en dos frentes: por una parte, la lógica del origen de la lógica y, por otra parte, la relación entre psicoanálisis y marxismo. Para ello se recuperan algunos textos publicados por Alain Badiou hacia finales de la década de 1960, en los que polemiza con Jacques-Alain Miller alrededor de los concepto de "sutura" y "sujeto" (Zizek), para situar tanto las (...) diversas posiciones como las coherentes reconsideraciones a lo largo de su trayectoria intelectual. En efecto, desde "El concepto de modelo" hasta su más reciente trilogía (Teoría del sujeto, El ser y el acontecimiento y Lógica de los Mundos), se propone una perspectiva que lejos de establecer jerarquías y subordinaciones busca promover conexiones a partir de las especificidades y las diferencias a través de esa vía particular que es la filosofía. De este modo resulta posible apreciar que, pese a su crítica respecto de la primacía de la lógica del significante, los conceptos propuestos por Jacques Lacan funcionaron como una notoria fuente de inspiración para Badiou, especialmente en relación con el sujeto del inconsciente. (shrink)

We commonly speak of people as being ‘‘justified’’ or ‘‘unjustified’’ in believing as they do. These terms describe a person’s epistemic condition. To be justified in believing as one does is to have a positive epistemic status in virtue of holding one’s belief in a way which fully satisfies the relevant epistemic requirements or norms. This requires something more (or other) than simply believing a proposition whose truth is well-supported by evidence, even by evidence which one possesses oneself, since one (...) could entirely miss the relevance of this evidence and hold the belief as a result of wishful thinking or for some other bad reason. My topic in this paper is the notion of being justified which precludes beliefs flawed in this way. I will take the notion of something’s telling in favor of the truth of a proposition—that is, the notion of evidential support—for granted. (shrink)

Is it coherent to suppose that in order to hold a belief responsibly, one must recognize something else as a reason for it? This paper addresses this question by focusing on so-called "Inferential Internalist" principles, that is principles of the following form: in order for one to have positive epistemic status Ø in virtue of believing P on the basis of R, one must believe that R evidentially supports P, and one must have positive epistemic status Ø in relation to (...) that latter belief as well. While such principles and their close relatives figure centrally in a wide variety of recent epistemological discussions, there is confusion in the literature about what, precisely, Inferential Internalism commits one to and whether it is so much as coherent. This paper articulates a broader framework for understanding the notion of epistemic responsibility, motivates Inferential Internalism on the basis of considerations about the basing relation, epistemic responsibility, and parallels with practical deliberation, defends Inferential Internalism against charges of incoherence leveled by James Van Cleve and Paul Boghossian, and shows that contrary to a currently widespread view, Inferential Internalism is coherent even if foundationalism and the a priori are rejected. The paper closes with a preliminary argument for an affirmative answer to the initiating question about the requirements of epistemic responsibility. (shrink)

Tom Kelly argues that instrumentalist aeeounts of epistemie rationality fail beeause what a person has reason to believe does not depend upon the eontent of his or her goals. However, his argument fails to distinguish questions about what the evidence supports from questions about what a person ought to believe. Once these are distinguished, the instrumentalist ean avoid Kelly’s objeetions. The paperconcludes by sketehing what I take to be the most defensible version of the instrumentalist view.

Guided by an account of the norms governing justificatory conversations, I propose that person-level epistemic justification is a matter of possessing a certain ability: the ability to provide objectively good reasons for one's belief by drawing upon considerations which one responsibly and correctly takes there to be no reason to doubt. On this view, justification requires responsible belief and is also objectively truth-conducive. The foundationalist doctrine of immediately justified beliefs is rejected, but so too is the thought that coherence in (...) one's total belief system is sufficient, or indeed necessary, for justification. The problem of the regress is solved by exploiting the 'localist' idea that in order to possess the ability to justify any given belief, one only needs to be in a position to draw upon appropriate justified background beliefs to provide good reasons for holding the belief; one needn't be able to defend the relevant background beliefs, and so on, all at one sitting. (shrink)

I take as my starting point the evident fact that people are capable of modifying their beliefs in response to reasons in the course of deliberation. This fact is sufficient to make notions such as responsibility, blameworthiness, and praiseworthiness applicable to people with regard to their beliefs. If a state is such, and one is such, that one is capable of determining it through one’s best evaluations of reasons in the course of deliberation, then even if it isn’t under one’s (...) voluntary control, it is attributable to one as something for which one is appropriately held accountable. There is thus conceptual space for the possibility of one’s conducting oneself poorly or well with regard to it, and accordingly for the application of praise or criticism. And there is room for an evaluation of whether one has conducted oneself responsibly or irresponsibly – that is, whether one has proceeded in a way that takes proper account of the considerations which one reasonably could have been expected to take account of, or not. (shrink)

Modern-day heirs of the Cartesian revolution have been fascinated by the thought that one could utilize certain hypotheses – that one is dreaming, deceived by an evil demon, or a brain in a vat – to argue at one fell swoop that one does not know, is not justified in believing, or ought not believe most if not all of what one currently believes about the world. A good part of the interest and mystique of these discussions arises from the (...) contention that the seeds of such arguments lie in our ordinary epistemic practices, so that external world skepticism can arise “from within”. But is this contention correct? I doubt it. Taking skepticism seriously requires that we address this question head on. To do so, I will approach skeptical arguments from a certain vantage point. I will try to stand, as far as possible, with both feet squarely in ordinary life. I will start out with all of our ordinary commitments about what is the case, about what we know or have reason to believe, about when someone knows, is justified, or has good reason to believe something, and about how one should proceed in deciding what to believe. My question, then, will be this. From within that vantage point can I somehow be moved in a reasonable way to accept the conclusion that I know far less about the world around me than I thought, or that epistemically speaking, I really ought not believe much of what I have believed about the world around me? In order for such movement to take place, I will have to find reason from within my ordinary standpoint to discount or reject much of what I ordinarily accept. And of course, that reason will have to come from some.. (shrink)

This book argues that external world skepticism is false for straightforward reasons. To make this case it develops and defends a neglected methodological approach involving a distinctive process of first-person reflection. We begin within the practices, procedures, and commitments of ordinary life and science. We then seek some reason to think skepticism true, carefully scrutinizing all the most important arguments. Finding no reason to think it true and decisive reasons to think it false, we reject it. As the book shows, (...) this is a fully satisfactory refutation. No epistemological theorizing is needed. The book begins by exploring and defending this method in seminal works of G. E. Moore and J. L. Austin. Turning to contemporary epistemology, it asks why we shouldn't appeal to considerations about the world when responding to skeptical argumentation. No good reason is found, despite exploration of a wide range of central issues in recent epistemology. To the contrary, perfectly ordinary examples indicate that it is correct to reject the skeptical scenarios - the dreaming worry, Descartes' evil demon, the brain-in-a-vat - by appealing to things we know about the world. Likewise, considerations about sensory perception do not provide any reason to think our evidence excludes considerations about the world. Along the way, methodological lessons are drawn from consideration of the most important skeptical arguments in the contemporary literature. The book concludes by defending the satisfactoriness of its approach. What emerges is a new understanding of what philosophical illumination might look like in relation to core epistemological issues. (shrink)

Two kinds of justification logics are studied. Then, this article shows how the notion of quasi-truth can be defined in these systems.

Keith DeRose has recently argued that the contextual variability of appropriate assertion, together with the knowledge account of assertion, yields a direct argument that 'knows' is semantically context-sensitive. The argument fails because of an equivocation on the notion of warranted assertability. Once the equivocation is removed, it can be seen that the invariantist can retain the knowledge account of assertion and explain the contextual variability of appropriate assertion by appealing to Williamson's suggestion that practical and conversational considerations can influence the (...) extent to which adherence to the constitutive norm of assertion matters. (shrink)

This examination of a fundamental but often neglected aspect of the intellectual history of early modern Europe brings together philosophers, historians and political theorists from Great Britain, Canada, the United States, Australia, France and Germany. Despite the diversity of disciplines and national traditions represented, the individual contributions show a remarkable convergence around three themes: changes in the modes of moral education in early modern Europe, the emergence of new relations between conscience and law (particularly the law of the state), and (...) the shared continuities and discontinuities of both Roman Catholic and Protestant moral culture in relation to their medieval past. (shrink)

Is there a plausible argument for external world skepticism? Robert Nozick’s well-known discussion focuses upon arguments which utilize the Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle. Nozick claims, correctly, that no such argument succeeds. But he gets almost all the details wrong. The Sensitivity Requirement and the Closure Principle are compatible; the Sensitivity Requirement is incorrect; and even if true, the Closure Principle is structurally incapable of generating a plausible and valid global skeptical argument. It is therefore a mistake to take (...) the Closure Principle as central in discussions of skepticism. The paper concludes by examining the prospects for a plausible skeptical argument. (shrink)

If p is false, it isn't evidence for anything. This view is central in one important response to a familiar sceptical argument. I consider and reject various motivations for refusing to accept this view – proposals arising from, e.g., our practice of providing rationalising explanations of people's beliefs, various locutions appearing to relativise evidence to persons, the significance of people's mental states for attributions of reasons to them, and the role of evidence in epistemic principles and requirements. I close by (...) considering responses to the ‘New Evil Demon Argument’. What emerges is an affirmation of the principle that p doesn't provide evidence unless it is true, a response to an important version of the Evil Demon argument for scepticism, and also a deeper interpretation of our epistemic practice. (shrink)

DeRose appeals to ordinary English usage to support his contextualist semantics for "know"-attributions. A common objection holds that though the relevant assertions are both appropriate and seemingly true, their seeming truth arises merely from their appropriateness. This Warranted Assertability Maneuver (WAM) aims to provide a stand-alone objection by providing a reason not to take the ordinary language data at face-value. However, there is no plausible model or mechanism for the pragmatic phenomena WAMmers must postulate. Given what the WAM requires, it (...) is doubtful it could work out in detail. (shrink)

“Moorean Dogmatist” responses to external world skepticism endorse courses of reasoning that many people find objectionable. This paper seeks to locate this dissatisfaction in considerations about epistemic responsibility. I sketch a theory of immediate warrant and show how it can be combined with plausible “inferential internalist” demands arising from considerations of epistemic responsibility. The resulting view endorses immediate perceptual warrant but forbids the sort of reasoning that “Moorean Dogmatism” would allow. A surprising result is that Dogmatism’s commitment to immediate epistemic (...) warrant isn’t enough to avoid certain standard arguments for skepticism about the external world. (shrink)

Fertility levels have dropped substantially in Latin America in recent decades, fuelled by increased contraceptive use and notably a method mix skewed towards female sterilization. This study examined choice of female sterilization in four Latin American countries: Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic and Peru. Data were drawn from national Demographic and Health Surveys conducted in 1995s reproductive histories to consider the effects of a number of sociodemographic and contextual determinants as they pertained to status at the moment of the event. (...) The results revealed that the likelihood of a womans propensity to choose sterilization. (shrink)

In the broadest sense of the term, fallibilism is an anti-dogmatic intellectual stance or attitude: an openness to the possibility that one has made an error and an accompanying willingness to give a fair hearing to arguments that one’s belief is incorrect (no matter what that belief happens to be about). So understood, fallibilism’s central insight is that it is possible to remain open to new evidence and arguments while also reasonably treating an issue as settled for the purposes of (...) current inquiry and action. Fallibilism, so construed, was given its most influential formulation – and its name – by C. S. Peirce, though it was advocated by earlier philosophers as well, particularly the later ancient skeptic Philo of Larissa and perhaps also Hume. Contemporary epistemologists almost universally agree in endorsing this intellectual stance; it is part of the undisputed framework within which contemporary epistemological theorizing takes place. (shrink)

Dual Process Theory is currently a popular theory for explaining why we show bounded rationality in reasoning and decision-making tasks. This theory proposes there must be a sharp distinction in thinking to explain two clusters of correlational features. One cluster describes a fast and intuitive process, while the other describes a slow and reflective one. A problem for this theory is identifying a common principle that binds these features together, explaining why they form a unity, the unity problem. To solve (...) it, a hypothesis is developed combining embodied predictive processing with symbolic classical approaches. The hypothesis, simplified, states that Type 1 processes are bound together because they rely on embodied predictive processing whereas Type 2 processes form a unity because they are accomplished by symbolic classical cognition. To show that this is likely the case, the features of Dual Process Theory are discussed in relation to these frameworks. (shrink)

Traduzido por João Duarte, o livro A Construção das Ciências: As Lógicas das Invenções Científicas, de Gerard Fourez, foi publicado em primeira edição no Brasil em 2002, pelo Instituto Piaget, recebendo uma reimpressão em 2009. O autor trabalha com a perspectiva socioconstrutivista.

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 108 Heft: 2 Seiten: 175-194.

This article shows that although Fitch’s paradox has been extremely widely studied, up to now no correct formalization of the problem has been proposed. The purpose of this article is to present the paradox front the viewpoint of combining logics. It is argued that the correct minimal logic to state the paradox is composed by a fusion of modal frames, and a fusion of modal languages and logics.

While recognizing its origins and scope, Alejandro A. Vallega offers a new interpretation of Latin American philosophy by looking at its radical and transformative roots. Placing it in dialogue with Western philosophical traditions, Vallega examines developments in gender studies, race theory, postcolonial theory, and the legacy of cultural dependency in light of the Latin American experience. He explores Latin America’s engagement with contemporary problems in Western philosophy and describes the transformative impact of this encounter on contemporary thought.

Traditional epistemological reflection on our beliefs about the world attempts to proceed without presupposing or ineliminably depending upon any claims about the world. It has been argued that epistemological externalism fails to engage in the right way with the motivations for this project. I argue, however, that epistemological externalism satisfyingly undermines this project. If we accept the thesis that certain conditions other than the truth of one's belief must obtain in the world outside of one's mind in order for one (...) to have knowledge (or justified belief) about the world, then there is no good intellectual motivation for taking up the traditional project. This results stands even if we accept the traditional theses that knowledge requires justified belief and that justified belief requires the ability to provide good reasons for one's belief. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to elucidate the evolution of the concept of poverty in Rousseau’s reflections. This will be done through the analysis of three depictions of poverty taken from the philosopher’s texts. The goal is to demonstrate that, beyond the apparent ambiguity in the use of the term ‘poverty,’ Rousseau engages in a semantic play with multiple functions, highlighting the importance of this theme. Finally, it will be proposed how the status of poverty can be seen as (...) relative, showing how the meaning of the term evolves into new senses. (shrink)

A ventilação mecânica invasiva (VMI) tem como objetivo melhorar trocas gasosas e reduzir o trabalho ventilatório de pacientes críticos. O desmame em traqueostomia é realizado usando modo ventilatório espontâneo e períodos fora da VMI de forma progressiva. O modo ventilatório utilizado pode ser, entre outros, ventilação por pressão (PSV) ou ventilação proporcional assistida (PAV). O objetivo foi comparar o uso do modo PSV e PAV no desmame de pacientes traqueostomizados. Foram recrutados 14 indivíduos, alocados em dois grupos, PSV e PAV, (...) realizaram protocolo de desmame e ao final foram avaliadas as variáveis tempo de VMI em traqueostomia, tempo de desmame ventilatório e taxas de sucesso de desmame. O grupo PAV obteve uma mediana melhor no desfecho dias de desmame, mas sem diferença estatisticamente significativa (p=0,459). Nosso estudo não sustenta o modo PAV como melhor escolha para desmame em pacientes traqueostomizados, são necessários novos estudos com tamanho amostral maior. (shrink)

Is knowledge a mental state? For philosophers working within the idealistic tradition, the answer is trivial: there is nothing else for knowledge to be. For most others, however, the claim has seemed prima facie implausible. Knowing that p requires or involves the fact that p, or p’s truth, and that – with certain specifiable exceptions – is quite independent of my mind; so while knowledge may require or involve certain mental states, it itself is not a state of mind.

This paper responds to Stephen Hetherington's discussion of my ‘Is Fallibility an Epistemological Shortcoming?’ (2004). The Infallibilist skeptic holds that in order to know something, one must be able to rule out every possible alternative to the truth of one’s belief. This requirement is false. In this paper I first clarify this requirement’s relation to our ordinary practice. I then turn to a more fundamental issue. The Infallibilist holds – along with many non-skeptical epistemologists – that Infallibility is epistemically superior (...) to the epistemic position attained when we have (what we ordinarily call) knowledge. This is false, too, as our ordinary practices show. Ordinary epistemic appraisal does not concern our standing on a scale of evaluation which has Infallibility at its apex. For this reason, even if gradualism is correct, it does not show how Infallibilist skepticism can arise out of our ordinary practice. (shrink)

O presente artigo apresenta como intuito primordial a promoção de uma análise acerca das relações entre o naturalismo filosófico de Hume e a sua oposição ao ceticismo radical, estabelecendo, nesse sentido, uma vinculação entre as teses naturalistas do autor em questão e a sua argumentação em prol do ceticismo moderado. A dissertação, num primeiro momento, abordará sobre os elementos centrais da chamada “geografia mental”, proposta por David Hume na primeira seção de seu livro Investigação sobre o entendimento Humano. Além disso, (...) será destacado o esforço do pensador na utilização do método experimental para a elaboração de uma nova ciência da natureza humana, ressaltando os princípios da natureza humana nas condições de percepção e conhecimento. O texto dissertativo realizará uma elucidação dos principais conceitos do empirismo do autor escocês, tais como: o hábito, a formação da crença, o papel da experiência nas inferências causais e a negação da razão como fundamento do conhecimento. Sob essa perspectiva, a construção dissertativa estabelecerá uma defesa da vinculação de David Hume ao “ceticismo COMPLEXITAS REVISTA DE FILOSOFIA TEMÁTICA – ISSN: 2525-4154 – QUALIS B3. Ed. 2022, V7, n 02. p. 01-16. 2 mitigado” em razão do naturalismo presente em sua obra, isto é, da compreensão segundo a qual os princípios da natureza atuam na percepção humana, orientando os indivíduos em sua postura de adoção de crenças e “verdades provisórias” como fundamentos de suas condutas. Fundamentado sob a metodologia de abordagem dedutiva, o presente trabalho foi construído com a utilização de fontes bibliográficas. (shrink)

O presente artigo apresenta como intuito primordial uma exposição acerca da temática da desumanização presente na literatura de testemunho de Primo Levi (1919-1987) e nas reflexões de Hannah Arendt (1906-1975), sobretudo em sua obra Eichmann em Jerusalém. A investigação acerca do fenômeno da desumanização no universo concentracionário nazista será realizada, primordialmente, a partir de sua relação com a tese da banalidade do mal, que aborda a impessoalização e a perda da consciência moral como integrantes do projeto totalitário de supressão da (...) individualidade e da banalização da barbárie. Numa primeira análise, foi estabelecida uma breve ponderação sobre os principais aspectos do “mal banal” na perspectiva da narrativa histórica de Arendt e de que forma tais elementos dialogam com a despersonalização. Em seguida, a temática da desumanização foi analisada propriamente na literatura primoleviana. Por fim, foi traçado um paralelo entre os dois autores, atestando, de forma categórica, um vínculo direto entre o totalitarismo, a proliferação da banalidade do mal e a desumanização. Fundamentado sob a metodologia de abordagem dedutiva, o presente trabalho foi construído com a utilização de fontes bibliográficas. (shrink)

This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of socially responsible funds in Sweden by assessing fund managers' abilities and performances across different market states. These issues are analyzed at the aggregate and individual fund levels. The paper also presents several new statistical tests that allow more precise inferences about differences in performance and the variability in fund returns arising from different benchmarks. In general, SR and conventional funds perform similarly to the market. At the aggregate level, SR funds investing in Sweden (...) and Europe perform similarly to conventional funds, while those investing globally tend to underperform. This underperformance seems to be linked with poor selectivity abilities of global SR fund managers. For individual funds, the performance of both types of funds is more similar. Most funds perform similarly in crisis periods compared to non-crisis periods. Overall, our results are consistent with a mature market for SR investing and support the view that the similar performance of SR and conventional funds is associated with the mainstreaming of SR investment in Sweden. These findings encourage SR investing both by socially conscious investors, who wish to align their social values with their investment decisions, as well as by conventional investors, who will not be penalized by investing in these funds. We also call attention to the difficulties investors face when trying to identify funds with high social standards, considering that there is scarce information on the extent to which each fund holds stocks that comply with ethical and social criteria. (shrink)

Este artigo propõe uma reflexão acerca do domínio da arte na perspectiva de Hannah Arendt. A partir da análise do pensamento da autora, de seus esforços em problematizar a relação dos homens com o âmbito da arte e das inúmeras vezes em que convoca produções artísticas para examinar a experiência humana no mundo, vislumbra-se identificar as especificidades atribuídas por ela às linguagens artísticas, bem como compreender a relevância da arte na constituição de um legado humano material, imaterial e simbólico, um (...) mundo de significados compartilhados.Palavras-chave: Domínio da arte. Linguagens artísticas. Hannah Arendt. (shrink)

Este artigo pretende discutir a interpretação de Heidegger relativamente a como a metafísica tradicional concebeu as noções de “ser” e de “ente”. De fato, conforme o autor, o pensamento ocidental entendido como metafísica confundiu ser e ente. Em seu início com Platão e Aristóteles, no momento em que o problema concernente ao sentido de ser ganhou fôlego no pensamento desses filósofos, esse tema já caiu no esquecimento e o que ambos conquistaram em suas reflexões se quedou trivializado durante toda a (...) história do pensamento ocidental, com muitas deturpações e incompreensões, até a Lógica de Hegel. Em decorrência disso, analisaremos também as consequências dessa posição fundamental, visto que ao não pensar a diferença ontológica, a metafísica tornou-se onto-teo-logia. (shrink)